[This was a response memo in my Politics of Development class at the Harvard Kennedy School]
As a student of industrial policy I have always been
fascinated by the so called “East Asian miracle”, and South Korea stands above
the rest in its ability to rapidly industrialize through export-led growth.
Scholars of South Korean industrialization such as Robert Wade and Alice Amsden
have emphasized the role of the state and political leadership in orchestrating
this ‘miracle’. Park Chung Hee led South Korea during its formative years from 1961
to 1979. I draw from the book Korea’s
Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79 by Kim
Hyung-A (2004) to analyze Park’s ‘guided capitalism’ through which he planned and
managed economic development using state-led intervention in industrial
enterprises. Kim Hyung-A’s study is based
on personal
interviews with Park’s principal technocrats in the 1970s as well as archival
documents from both Korea and the USA.
Several
factors are seen motivating Park in his quest for power. According to Kim Hyung-A, Park had a humble upbringing and he came
of age during Japanese colonial control of Korea. Despite having served in the
Japanese army, Park resented the ‘Japanization’ of Korea. He also abhorred
Korea’s excessive[1]
reliance on US-aid after Japan’s surrender in 1945, and the conditions this
came with such as democratizing South Korea. He was able to win the elections
in 1961 by appealing to the national desire for genuine sovereignty and
development via what he called the ‘Korean way’. Korea’s industrialization and
propensity to export thus partly came from Park’s need to build a
self-sustaining defense industry and to accumulate foreign reserves
should US assistance end. From 1961 he led a centrally organized political
system and he recruited a core of planners that would carry out the heavy and
chemical industrialization (HCI), which in turn would strengthen military
defense. Park chose big conglomerates, or the chaebol, as his
industrial partners, and technocrats rather than economic bureaucrats as his
policy advisers (2).
Park’s
tactics were not always welcomed despite their effectiveness. For example, he
established a Confucian military-style master–student relationship between the
government and the business community by means of what he called
“administrative controls” over every business group. He confiscated property of
51 prominent businessmen, whom he later released after they each signed a
statement saying “I will donate all my property when the government requires it
for national construction” (81). In exchange for their cooperation Park’s “guided
capitalism” offered extensive support protection and privileges. These included
foreign loan guarantees, financial subsidies, protection from independent
unionism and a fixed-wage system. These measures were specifically designed to
create large-scale national enterprises through existing chaebol. In particular, the government’s foreign loan guarantee
system (enacted in July 1962) allowed big business to access massive borrowings
from abroad (ibid).
Park’s
guiding principles were patriotism and economic nationalism. He relied heavily
on the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) for security, so that no one,
under any circumstance, could obstruct him, or his state (206). Kim Hyung-A reports that Park even had his
family tracked! Park’s technocrats in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
(MCI) became the driving force behind Korea’s export-oriented industry
construction (EOIC). MCI resembled Japan’s MITI in its focus on technical micro
policies to boost exports for example. Many insiders within MCI particularly
noted the role of Minister Pak Ch’unghun who became known as “the Export
Minister.” According to Kim Hyung-A, Pak
apparently urged President Park as follows:
Exports are the only means to save us. I believe, from now on, we as a nation must strive to implement the export-first policy by designating it as the supreme priority of the nation. And, I urge you, Mr. President, that you lead us as the Supreme Commander. I also urge you to encourage us as well to eradicate bottlenecks [to facilitate exports.]…..Kim Hyung-A, 2004: 115.
Park
personally chaired the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting and many other regular
reviews, which meant that he directly managed the performance monitoring of all
firms in the promoted industries. Korea achieved $100 million in export
earnings in 1964 and by 1971, exports exceeded 1 billion dollars. As a result,
the MCI formally declared December 5th as Export Day.
Export-led
growth facilitated increases in per capita incomes and empowerment of the civil
society, which became increasingly vocal over state suppression of individual
freedoms and corruption. There was discontent with the preferential foreign
loan arrangements and the associated corruption, especially between politicians
and chaebol. Moreover, financial
instability, due largely to economic recession and excessive foreign loans in
the late 1960s, became increasingly serious. The de-registration of 30
insolvent companies by Presidential Secretary Chang Tokchin in April 1969, was
symptomatic of the many problems underlying Korea’s rapid economic growth.
In
conclusion, Park’s legacy, for better or for worse, means that much of the character
of the Korean people today and of their society is inextricably bound up with
the political and economic system that he put in place under his regime. According
to Kim Hyung-A (2004), Park is repeatedly acknowledged by his people as the
“most effective president ever” and his reputation in international circles is
also high (7). Almost everyone who holds a position of authority in Korea today
is in some way a product of Park’s policies, and thus profoundly influenced by
them (205). Many developments of political significance that have happened in
Korea since 1979, after Park’s assassination are in some way either a
continuation of, or a reaction against, what happened in the Park era.
Reference:
- Kim Hyung-A
(2004). Korea’s Development under
Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79. RoutledgeCurzon/Asian Studies Association of
Australia (ASAA) East Asia Series.
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